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Discovery of Plaintiffs' Financial Situation
in Federal ClassActions: Heading 'em
Off at the Passbook
By Betty C. Bullock*
Introduction
When introduced into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Rule 23 class action' was envisioned by its drafters as beneficial to all
connected with such a lawsuit: courts, plaintiffs, and defendants.
Courts were to be benefited because of the judicial economy fostered
by the consolidation of scores of potential individual lawsuits, plaintiffs
would have a method to combine forces in a lawsuit they might not
have the resources to bring as individuals, and defendants would be
able to avoid repetitious litigation of numerous small claims.
Of these three groups, only plaintiffs have eagerly embraced the
class action. At times, courts have been suspicious of the motives un-
derlying class actions as well as finding such suits more burdensome
and awkward than individual suits. 2 Defendants have uniformly and
persistently resisted class suits, and for good reasons. Not only are
class actions more complicated and costly to defend, but defendants
face much greater potential liability with multiple plaintiffs who, if left
to their own devices, might not bring suits individually, especially for
small claims.3 In addition, class certification enhances the plaintiffs'
* B.A., 1958, Baylor University. Member, Third year Class.
1. Rule 23 was adopted in 1938 and rewritten in 1966. See generally 7 C. WRIGHT &
A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1751 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
WRIGHT & MILLER].
2. Some courts also seem to fear that lawyers create class suits just to obtain large fees.
One judge suggested that counsel was not setting up a case to be tried but rather "an over-
whelmingly costly and potent engine for the compulsion of settlements, whether just or un-
just." Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 238 (9th Cir. 1974) (Duniway, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
3. See Simon v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 73 F.R.D. 480, 487 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
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bargaining position, particularly in settlement negotiations. As a re-
suit, defendants' attorneys have developed numerous techniques to at-
tack class certification.
One such technique has been the defendants' use of the liberal dis-
covery rules to attempt to compel disclosure of financial data about the
representative plaintiffs. If discovery is allowed and the named plain-
tiffs' resources are found to be few, defendants challenge the plaintiffs'
financial ability to bring a suit on behalf of the unnamed class mem-
bers and request that class certification be denied. Even if well fi-
nanced, plaintiffs usually are not eager to disclose such personal
information or to reveal the extent of their willingness or ability to fi-
nance the suit lest defendants choose to outlast plaintiffs' financial ca-
pabilities and have the means to do so. Thus, plaintiffs resist this line
of discovery.
This Note examines the peculiar problems of financing a class ac-
tion that result in plaintiffs' vulnerability to financial challenge. It dis-
cusses the mixed reactions of the federal courts to the various theories
used by defendants seeking financial discovery and denial of certifica-
tion. Finally, this Note suggests an approach that balances the legiti-
mate interests of all parties while not unduly discouraging class actions.
Financing a Class Action
To assess the validity of requests for discovery of the named plain-
tiffs' finances, it is necessary first to examine the kinds of costs that may
arise in class actions and how they may be met. As in any lawsuit,
plaintiffs must be concerned with certain basic expenses such as attor-
neys' fees, filing and court costs, fees and expenses of witnesses, and
discovery costs. Because class suits are generally more complex than
individual suits, the costs are substantially greater. Usually the most
burdensome cost, at least in "common question ' 4 class suits, is that of
sending notice to all potential class members,5 who may number in the
thousands or even millions.
6
If the plaintiffs prevail, certain costs7 may be shifted to the defend-
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); see note 46 infra.
5. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); see notes 64-68 & accompanying
text infra.
6. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 175 (1974) (plaintiff had
sought to represent 2,250,000 ascertainable investors); see notes 64-68 infra.
7. Costs should be distinguished from attorneys' fees. The American rule has tradi-
tionally been that, absent special circumstances or a statutory provision to the contrary, even
a prevailing plaintiff will not be reimbursed for attorneys' fees. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co.
v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247, 257 (1975).
In practice, the prospect of paying attorneys' fees may not pose much of a problem to
the plaintiff. In a class suit with a good chance of success, attorneys frequently are willing to
work on a contingent fee basis. This method is permitted in the ABA Code of Professional
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ant at the discretion of the trial court, in accordance with equitable
principles8 or statutory allowances. 9 Even so, there are limits to the
costs the defendant may be required to pay.10 In federal courts, the
cost of compensating plaintiffs' witnesses in excess of mileage and per
diem subsistence cannot be shifted to the defendant."1 The cost for
expert witnesses often exceeds this modest amount and must ultimately
be paid by plaintiffs. Also, certain pretrial deposition costs may not be
recoverable from the defendant if the court finds the depositions were
taken only as part of the attorneys' investigation rather than for use in
the trial.12 Not only can some costs not be shifted but, in any case, all
costs must be originally met by plaintiffs. Thus, a class action is apt to
be an expensive undertaking for plaintiffs even if they eventually
prevail.
The most difficult financial problem for plaintiffs is paying the
ongoing expenses of the suit, such as notice, discovery, and witness fees.
Plaintiffs have several alternatives for raising funds for these costs.
First, plaintiffs can finance the entire cost of the suit personally with
the expectation of reimbursement from the defendants if they prevail. 13
However, this alternative requires expending large sums of money in a
suit that probably will not be resolved for several years. If each plain-
tiffs claim is relatively small, the risk of losing capital in an unsuccess-
Responsibility. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 2, EC 2-20 (1975).
Under the contingent fee arrangement, there would be no attorneys' fees for the plaintiff to
pay if the lawsuit fails. If the lawsuit succeeds, courts appear willing to award attorneys'
fees if a common fund is created or protected. See, e.g., United States v. Equitable Trust
Co., 283 U.S. 738 (1931). Attorneys' fees are still available under the ascertainable common-
benefit or bad-faith exceptions to the prohibition against shifting fees. Alyeska Pipeline
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soe'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257-59 (1975). See general , 10 WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 2, § 2675 (1973 & Supp. 1977). In addition, attorneys' fees are awarded
to prevailing plaintiffs under many statutes. See, e.g., Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976);
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Supp. V 1975). For a list of statutes allowing
attorneys' fees, see Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soe'y, 421 U.S. 240, 260 n.33
(1975).
8. FED. R. Crv. P. 54(d) states: "Except when express provision therefor is made either
in a statute of the United States or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the
prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs." See Maldonado v. Parasole, 66 F.R.D.
388, 392 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); 10 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 2668 (1973).
9. See, e.g., Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §
216(b) (Supp. V 1975).
10. Costs under Rule 54(d) which can be shifted are less than the total expenses in-
curred in an action. Without special exercise of judicial discretion, many expenses must be
borne by the prevailing party. See, eg., Swan Carburetor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 149 F.2d
476 (6th Cir. 1945); see 10 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 2666 (1973).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1821 (1970); see United States v. Article of Drug, 428 F. Supp. 278,282
(D.C. Tenn. 1976); 10 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 2678 (1973).
12. See 10 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 2676 (1973).
13. See note 8 supra.
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ful suit usually far outweighs possible individual recoveries. 14 This
fact alone has led some courts to doubt whether a plaintiff would actu-
ally risk so much money for such a small possible return.' 5
Second, the representative plaintiffs can urge other identified, un-
named class members to join in financing the class action. Although
the representative plaintiffs cannot compel the unnamed plaintiffs to
contribute,16 they are free to ask others to participate in the suit. One
court has remarked, however, that this should be done before the suit is
commenced so that plaintiffs would not have to depend on others join-
ing later to provide the necessary resources. 17 With some limitations,
even the attorney for the class may solicit funds from class members to
cover the expenses of preparing for litigation.'8
14. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 161 (1974), plaintiffs claim was for
$70.
15. See, e.g., Chevalier v. Baird Say. Ass'n, 72 F.R.D. 140, 147 n.15 (E.D. Pa. 1976);
Axelrod v. Saks & Co., 24 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1070, 1075 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (threshold re-
quirement for membership in the class was $250). In Axelrod, the court noted: "Although
the defendants do not seriously contend that the named plaintiffs are unable or unwilling to
bear the cost of sending the required notice to absent members of the proposed (b)(3) class, I
fully share their sense of incredulity at the following colloquy taken from Adis' deposition:
'Q Do you know how many people we are talking about in your class?
'A Approximately 25,000. I'm not sure.
'Q So it would cost mailing cost for 25,000 people?
'A Approximately.
'Q It might cost more for whatever you insert?
'A It could.




'Q Are you able to spend $100,000?
'A Yes.'




'Q Whatever it costs you are prepared to spend?
'A Yes.
'Q Is there any limit on the amount you are prepared to spend?
'A There's no limit.'
16. Lamb v. United Sec. Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 44, 49 (S.D. Iowa 1973). It is not proper,
however, to allow a person who is not a class member voluntarily to pay litigation expenses
because it "smacks of [m]aintenance." Norman v. Arcs Equities Corp., 72 F.R.D. 502, 504
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
17. "Such a lawsuit should never be undertaken in the hope that at some future date
the existence of a class will aid the plaintiffs in carrying the case to completion, because
nobody knows whether other unidentified members of the class are able or willing to finance
the action." Ralston v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 61 F.R.D. 427, 434 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
18. ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, INFORMAL OPIN-
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Soliciting funds from class members would seem to be the best
way to finance the class action because it does not cause as many
problems for the court as do the other methods. Organizations use this
method most effectively because notice can be sent to the members
with regular mailings without much difficulty, and the action can be
financed from the treasury.' 9 For individuals who do not have ready
access to the network of unnamed plaintiffs, however, this method is of
limited utility. Communicating with the unnamed plaintiffs may be
one of the most expensive activities of the suit.
A third possible means of financing the suit calls for the plaintiffs'
attorney to advance the funds. The method is acknowledged by the
American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility Disci-
plinary Rule 5-103(B), which states that the attorney may advance or
guarantee the expenses of litigation, provided the client remains ulti-
mately liable for such expenses. The Code clearly does not encourage
such assistance, 20 and the courts echo this attitude.21 The concern is
that the attorney might be obtaining a proprietary interest in the law-
suit by advancing costs.2 One judge spoke of this as a form of
"abuse" which would substitute plaintiffs' attorney for the representa-
tive plaintiffs as the "real party in interest in class litigation."23 By
controlling the finances, the attorney might be able to take over the
primary decision making in order to maximize fees.24
IONS, No. 1326 (1975). The attorney's solicitation must state the prospective use of the
funds, which may not be used to pay attorneys' fees. Plaintiffs, however, may properly solicit
funds from the unnamed members of the class to pay the attorneys' fees. Id
19. See, ag., Sayre v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 65 F.R.D. 379 (E.D.
Pa. 1974) (labor union).
20. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 5, EC 5-8 (1975).
21. See, ag., P.D.Q. Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 61 F.R.D. 372, 378-81 (S.D. Fla.
1973). This court interpreted the ABA Code provision to mean that advancement of funds
is a "necessary evil" to be allowed only when the client has no other way to exercise his legal
rights. Id at 379.
22. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL1ITY, CANON 5, DR 5-103 (1975) forbids
a lawyer from acquiring a proprietary interest in any suit the lawyer is conducting. Excep-
tions are liens to secure fees or expenses and contracts for reasonable contingent fees in civil
cases.
23. Rode v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 24 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 322, 323 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
Recognizing the possibility of conflicts of interests, several courts have ruled that the attor-
ney cannot also serve as the named plaintiff. See, e.g., Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp.,
534 F.2d 1085 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976); Turoffv. May Co., 531 F.2d 1357
(6th Cir. 1976). Butsee Lamb v. United Sec. Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 25 (S.D. Iowa 1972). This
prohibition has also been extended to family members of the attorney. See, e.g., Stull v.
Pool, 63 F.R.D. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (wife of class attorney not a proper representative).
But see Fischer v. International Tel. and Tel. Corp., 23 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 795 (E.D.N.Y.
1976) (father of class attorney was an adequate representative). See generaly Kane, Stand-
ing, Mootness, and Federal Rule 23-Balancing Perspectives, 26 BUFFALO L. REv. 83, 112-14
(1976-77).
24. For example, the attorney might decide that it would be more advantageous to
On the other hand, several strong arguments can be made for per-
mitting an attorney to advance the costs of litigation. First, it may be
the only way a client of modest means can bring the suit.25 One court
noted that this type of arrangement would be a predictable element in
any class action brought by plaintiffs with limited resources or small
individual claims.26 The class action is the way the "little guy" is sup-
posed to be able to bring his claim for relief. The same court com-
mented that "in precisely those cases where the class action device is
most appropriate the disparity between the costs of litigation and the
resources of the individual plaintiffs will be most pronounced."2 7 To
hold that the attorney cannot advance costs in such cases might defeat
the purpose for which class actions were designed. This is particularly
true in highly complex litigation such as antitrust suits where public
policy encourages private suits to enforce the antitrust laws.28 The cost
of bringing such an action individually can be prohibitive despite the
prospect of a statutory award of treble damages.29
Thus, all three methods of financing outlined above pose some
practical or ethical problems.
Defendant's Attempt at Fhiancial Discovery
The issue of plaintiffs' financial circumstances most commonly is
raised by the defendant in the context of a discovery motion seeking
information regarding such matters as the total financial worth of the
plaintiffs, the plaintiffs' fee arrangements with the attorney, and the
source of the plaintiffs' funds.30 The plaintiffs' attorney will object to
these obviously sensitive inquiries on the grounds that (1) the disclo-
accept a lower settlement for the class than spend time in court; conversely, the attorney
might decide that greater fees would be created by prolonging the suit rather than negotiat-
ing a settlement. Such flagrant abuses as these, however, could be brought to the attention of
the court in the evidentiary hearing on the attorney's fee application. See general, 7A
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note I, § 1803 (1972 & Supp. 1977).
25. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 5, EC 5-8 (1975) notes that
a loan to a client is proper when advancements of costs may be the only way a client can
pursue his cause of action.
26. Sayre v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 65 F.R.D. 379, 383 (E.D. Pa.
1974).
27. Id at 385.
28. P.D.Q. Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 61 F.R.D. 372, 380 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) provides: "Any person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any dis-
trict court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or
has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
30. An example of the type and scope of questions asked is found in In re Independent
Gasoline Antitrust Litigation, 23 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 793, 794 nn.2-6 (D. Md. 1977): "Set forth
your gross and net income on an annual basis.
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sure of the information would violate attorney-client privilege,31 (2) the
discovery amounts to harassment,32 and/or (3) the information lacks
relevance. 33
Plaintiffs' Objection Based on Attorney-Client Privilege34
Even if the plaintiffs allege that attorney-client privilege bars dis-
covery of the financial arrangements between the client and lawyer,
few courts have denied discovery solely on this basis. Many courts
hold that "[i]n the absence of unusual circumstances, the amount of an
attorney's fee and the conditions of his employment do not come within
the attorney-client privilege." 35 This interpretation seems to be consis-
tent with the policy underlying attorney-client privilege, that of protect-
ing confidential information given by the client to the attorney.36 The
contract with the client and the amount of the fee are deemed facts
"Identify all documents (a) which refer or relate to net worth and (b) which would
disclose your current indebtedness.
"Identify all documents which refer or relate to your ability to pay the costs of this
lawsuit, including any agreements with counsel to advance or pay for costs of this lawsuit.
"State the maximum amount you are prepared to expend in this litigation.
"Identify each individual who must provide prior authorization or approval for the
expenditure of funds for prosecution of your case." See generally Hausmann, Legal Ethics
and Litigation Tactics, 2 CLASS AcTIO N iEP. 3 (1973).
31. See, eg., Sanderson v. Winner, 507 F.2d 477, 479 (10th Cir. 1974) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 914 (1975); Sayre v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 65
F.R.D. 379,381 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (excepts questions regarding plaintiffs' financial worth from
this ground).
32. See, e.g., Elster v. Alexander, 74 F.R.D. 503, 505 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
33. See, ag., Sanderson v. Winner, 507 F.2d 477, 479 (10th Cir. 1974) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 914 (1975); Elster v. Alexander, 74 F.R.D. 503, 504 (N.D. Ga. 1976);
Sayre v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 65 F.R.D. 379, 381 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
34. The essentials of attorney-client privilege are: "(1) Where legal advice of any kind
is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the
communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at
his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8)
except the protection be waived." 8 J. WIGMOp, EVIDENCE § 2292 (rev. ed. J.
McNaughton 1961).
35. Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 211, 214 (N.D. IM. 1972); see In re Semel,
411 F.2d 195, 197 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 905 (1969); Behrens v. Hironimus, 170
F.2d 627, 628 (4th Cir. 1948); United States v. Pape, 144 F.2d 778, 782 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 752 (1944). But see Magida v. Continental Can Co., 12 F.R.D. 74, 77 (S.D.N.Y.
1951).
36. The four conditions that must be present before recognition of any privilege are:
"(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed. (2)
This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of
the relation between the parties. (3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the
community ought to be sedulouslyfostered. (4) The injury that would inure to the relation
by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for
the correct disposal of litigation." J. WiGmoa, EVIDENCE § 2285 (rev. ed. J. McNaughton
1961); see note 34 supra.
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within the attorney's knowledge rather than confidential communica-
tions. Any arrangement plaintiffs made among themselves to finance
the suit would not become privileged because it was revealed to the
attorney.37 In light of the courts' attempt to interpret the attorney-cli-
ent privilege narrowly, 38 this objection by the plaintiff is unlikely to
succeed in barring discovery of financial information in future cases.
Plaintiffs' Objection Based on Harassment
Discovery should be denied when the defendant's purpose is to
delay the trial or to harass or embarrass the representatives.3 9 The
bare charge of harassment has not formed a successful basis for barring
discovery of plaintiffs' financial information. Nevertheless, the courts
show an underlying realization of the potential for harassment in such
discovery. The court's concept of what the defendant or plaintiffs
might be trying to achieve influences the tone of the decision and the
direction the court takes.4° Thus, the courts seem to balance the equi-
ties no matter what basis is given expressly for allowing or denying this
discovery.
Plaintiffs' Objection Based on Lack of Relevance
Even though neither attorney-client privilege nor a charge of har-
assment is likely to bar financial discovery, the requested information
still will not be discoverable unless it is relevant under the liberal dis-
covery rules of the federal courts. Rule 26(b) provides: "Parties may
obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant
to the subject matter involved in the pending action" 41 as long as it
"appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
37. Cf United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 193 F. Supp. 251, 253 (N.D.N.Y.
1960) (privilege did not attach to copy of interoffice memorandum passing between execu-
tives even though original sent to attorney).
38. See, e.g., Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 211, 212 (N.D. Ill. 1972); 8 J.
WIGMORn, EVIDENCE § 2291 (rev. ed. J. McNaughton 1961); see note 35 & accompanying
text supra.
39. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 98 S. Ct. 2380, 2390 n.17 (1978); see United
States v. Howard, 360 F.2d 373, 381 (3d Cir. 1966); Balistrieri v. Holtzman, 52 F.R.D. 23, 24-
25 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
40. Compare Sanderson v. Winner, 507 F.2d 477, 480 (10th Cir. 1974) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 914 (1975) (court speaks of oppressive discovery used to discourage
private antitrust suits) with Rode v. Emery Air Frieght Corp., 24 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 322, 324-
25 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (court discusses the possibility of the plaintiff bringing a frivolous class
suit to blackmail the defendant).
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). It is well established that relevancy is measured by the
subject matter of the action. United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 66
F.RD. 180, 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Foremost Promotions, Inc. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 15
F.R.D. 128, 129 (N.D. IM. 1953); Kaiser-Frazer Corp. v. Otis & Co., 11 F.R.D. 50, 53
(S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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evidence. '42 Relevancy is more loosely construed for purposes of dis-
covery than for trial since one of the primary functions of pretrial dis-
covery is the identification and narrowing of the issues. Thus,
relevancy in discovery embraces broader concepts than the precise is-
sues presented by the pleadings.
43
Some courts have held that financial information about the plain-
tiffs is irrelevant to the "subject matter" of the action and therefore not
discoverable.44 The Supreme Court has recently stated that discovery is
not so limited.45 Relevancy is construed broadly in class suits to in-
clude not only "subject matter" but also information bearing on
whether class certification should be granted. This would include all
matters pertaining to Rule 23 requirements."
42. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1).
43. See cases cited at note 41 supra.
44. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1228 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Foremost Promo-
tions, Inc. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 15 F.R.D. 128 (N.D. Il1. 1953) (arrangement for fees). In
Bogosilan, the defendant moved to compel answers to deposition questions regarding finan-
cial arrangements between the representative plaintiff and his counsel, the plaintiffs net
worth, and the plaintifi's ability to satisfy a judgment for costs in the event the defendant
prevailed. The court denied this motion, holding that these questions were outside the
scope of the discovery provision because they were neither relevant to the subject matter nor
did they appear "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
337 F. Supp. at 1230 (quoting FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(1)). This case represents a very narrow
interpretation of the term "relevance" in class suits. Under this approach the financial situ-
ation of plaintiffs never would be relevant unless expressly within the range of the litigated
controversy.
45. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 98 S. Ct. 2380, 2390 n.13 (1978).
46. Id The plaintiff must meet all of the prerequisites of FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). In
addition, at least one of the elements in FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) must be satisfied. These
subdivisions read as follows:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if(1) the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action
if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of
the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for
the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not
parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to pro-
tect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds gener-
ally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Under this approach defendants' primary basis for urging the rele-
vance of plaintiffs' financial information rests on the Rule 23(a)(4) re-
quirement that "the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class." 47  The court's determination of
whether plaintiffs' financial situation has any relevance to plaintiffs'
adequacy of representation ultimately determines whether or not this
financial information is discoverable.
Relevance of Plaintiffs' Financial Adequacy
Of the four requirements in Rule 23(a), courts consider adequacy
of representation to be the most crucial48 and the most difficult to inter-
pret. The importance of this requirement stems from the fact that class
actions are an exception to the general rule that all persons are entitled
to their day in court and are not bound by the judgment in any suit in
which they did not appear as parties.49 Inasmuch as the class action
consolidates potential suits and makes recovery possible for individual
plaintiffs, there must be a corresponding guarantee to defendants that
they will not be subject to subsequent suits by dissatisfied members of
the class. For this reason, persons who the court determines to be class
members and who do not request exclusion50 are bound by the final
judgment.5' If the suit is allowed to proceed with inadequate represen-
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and effi-
cient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution
or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concern-
ing the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C)
the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the
particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management
of a class action.
47. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
48. P.D.Q. Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 61 F.R.D. 372, 376 (S.D. Fla. 1973); De Milia v.
Cybernetics Int'l Corp., 15 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1385, 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
49. For the general rule, see Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940). For class suits,
see note 51 infra.
50. Class members in a class action under subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2) of Rule 23 may
not request exclusion. See note 51 infra.
51. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3) reads: "The judgment in an action maintained as a class
action under subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include
and describe those whom the court finds to be members of the class. The judgment in an
action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(3), whether or not favorable to the
class, shall include and specify or describe those to whom the notice provided in subdivision
(c)(2) was directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be
members of the class." The binding effect has caused some severe problems in class actions.
Since these concerns are outside the scope of this Note, it will be assumed throughout the
discussion that the class members are bound. For discussion on binding effects, see Note,
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tation and results in a decision unfavorable to the class, unnamed class
members will lose the right to a separate remedy and may be bound by
an unfair decision. The only alternative would be to allow collateral
attack on due process grounds, but this destroys the desired judicial
efficiency and the defendants' protection from subsequent suits.5 2 To
avoid such results, the courts carefully scrutinize the adequacy of repre-
sentation when the plaintiffs request that the suit be certified as a class
action.
5 3
In evaluating adequacy of representation, courts take a two-
pronged approach. Not only is the adequacy of the representative
plaintiffs considered, but the adequacy of the attorney seeking to repre-
sent the class is also examined. The attorney must be qualified, exper-
ienced, and generally able to conduct the litigation with some
expertise s4 Courts are generally lenient in evaluating the attorney's
qualifications and experience, indulging in a presumption of compe-
tence. Their attitude is that "[u]ntil the contrary is demonstrated,
courts will assume that members of the bar are skilled in their
profession. '55
The adequacy of the representative plaintiffs is measured by the
"forthrightness and vigor" with which they can be expected to assert
the interests of unnamed members of the class. 56 The courts weigh
several factors in making this determination. It is generally agreed
The Importance of Being Adequat" Due Process Requirements in Class Actions under Federal
Rule 23, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1217 (1975).
52. "Although thus declaring that the judgment in a class action includes the class, as
defined, subdivision (c)(3) does not disturb the recognized principle that the court con-
ducting the action cannot predetermine the res judicata effect of the judgment; this can be
tested only in a subsequent action." Proposed amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for
the United States District Courts, Advisory Comm. Note to R. 23, 39 F.R.D. 73, 106 (1966).
53. Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973) (inadequate representation was the
basis for setting aside binding effect on the plaintiff); P.D.Q. Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 61
F.R.D. 372, 377-78- (S.D. Fla. 1973).
54. Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 247 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
1011 (1975); Hi-Co Enterprises, Inc. v. Conagra, Inc., 23 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 460, 463 (S.D. Ga.
1976); Chevalier v. Baird Say. Ass'n, 72 F.R.D. 140, 144 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
55. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other grounds,
438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1971); see Dennis v. Saks & Co., 20 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 994, 997
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); MacLean v. Honeywell Information Sys., Inc., 20 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1015,
1017 (D. Mass. 1975). But see Fendler v. Westgate-California Corp., 527 F.2d 1168, 1170
(9th Cir. 1975) (refusal to allow class action based on evaluation of attorney's competence);
Taub v. Glicknan, 14 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (class action denied because
attorney was not an adequate representative).
56. The courts want to be sure that the representative party "will put up a real fight."
Lim v. Citizens Say. & Loan Ass'n, 430 F. Supp. 802, 811 (N.D. Cal. 1976); National Auto
Brokers Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 60 F.R.D. 476,486-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); De Milia v.
Cybernetics Int'l Corp., 15 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1385, 1389 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Mersay v. First
Republic Corp., 43 F.R.D. 465, 469-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D.
472, 494 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'don other grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1971).
that representative plaintiffs must have no conflict of interest with
members of the class. 57 Some courts also have required that represen-
tative plaintiffs have a strong stake in the outcome, either economic5 8
or personal.5 9
Not so clear is the degree to which plaintiffs must demonstrate that
they have adequate financial resources. Defendants have advanced
various arguments that adequacy of representation includes plaintiffs'
financial ability (1) to pay for notice to unnamed class members,60 (2)
to pay costs of litigation,61 (3) to reimburse funds advanced by the at-
torney,62 or (4) to pay costs, and possibly the attorney's fees of a suc-
cessful defendant. 63 The courts' responses to these arguments have had
little uniformity. The merits and degree of success of these efforts to
establish the relevancy of plaintiffs' financial situation is the focus of
the remainder of this Note.
Plaintiffs' Ability to Pay for Notice
The landmark case of Eisen IV64 made clear the necessity for
plaintiffs to pay the cost of sending notice to unnamed class members.
That case interpreted the notice requirement of Rule 23(c)(2).65 The
Supreme Court held that, based on its past decisions 66 and the express
language of the rule, individual notice had to be mailed to the
2,250,000 identified class members. The Court stated that "individual
notice to identifiable class members is not a discretionary consideration
57. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1940); Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th
Cir. 1973); Free World Foreign Cars, Inc. v. Alfa Romeo, S.P.A., 55 F.R.D. 26, 29 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
58. See, e.g., Green v. Missouri R.R., 62 F.R.D. 434,436 (E.D. Mo. 1973). The ration-
ale is that a party cannot be expected to prosecute vigorously without a large financial stake
in the outcome. This rationale has been criticized, however, as contrary to the purpose of
Rule 23: 'Since, as we have seen, if the plaintiffs claim is very large a class action is ren-
dered unnecessary, the main purpose of the class action is to provide a means of vindicating
small claims. It would be anomalous to hold that only major financial interests can make
use of it." Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 495 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other
grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1971); see Kom v. Franchard Corp., 456 F.2d 1206, 1212 (2d
Cir. 1972).
59. Waldman v. Electrospace Corp., 68 F.R.D. 281, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
60. See notes 64-76 & accompanying text infra.
61. See notes 77-102 & accompanying text infra.
62. See notes 103-126 & accompanying text infra.
63. See notes 127-137 & accompanying text infra.
64. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
65. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) states: "In any class action maintained under subdivision
(b)(3), the court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the
circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through
reasonable effort."
66. See Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 212-13 (1962); Mullane v. Cen-
tral Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).
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to be waived in a particular case." 67 Furthermore, the cost burden
could not be shifted to the defendant by use of a preliminary hearing
on the merits of the case.
68
Given the requirement that plaintiffs must finance the cost of no-
tice, discovery of whether plaintiffs would be willing and able to do so
seems quite firm. The only United States court of appeals subse-
quently to address this issue was the Tenth Circuit in Sanderson v.
Winner.69 In that case the district court had granted defendants' re-
quest to discover plaintiffs' financial statements, tax returns, and any
other documents that would show plaintiffs' ability to finance the suit.
The plaintiffs appealed for writs of mandamus and prohibition di-
recting the district court to vacate these discovery orders.
The appellate court agreed with the district court that it was neces-
sary to determine whether plaintiffs could pay the costs of proper no-
tice as mandated by Eisen IV.70 The discovery of plaintiffs' financial
condition was not allowed, however, because they already had agreed
to pay the costs of notice to potential class members, and plaintiff San-
derson's salary was a matter of record.
In a later district court case, MacLean v. Honeywell Informa-
tion Systems, Inc.,71 a magistrate expressed his agreement with the
Sanderson interpretation of Eisen IV and the need for the court's con-
cern about plaintiffs' ability to afford proper notice. The court al-
lowed the defendant to interrogate the plaintiff about her financial
ability to furnish proper notice to all unnamed class members.
72
Although courts generally agree that plaintiffs' ability to send
proper notice to the class is relevant,73 some courts have held that the
plaintiffs' financial condition becomes irrelevant once the attorney ad-
vances the money for the suit, thereby assuring adequate notice. For
example, in Sayre v. Abraham Lincoln Federal Savings & Loan
Association,74 the court ruled that questions regarding plaintiffs' fi-
nances became irrelevant when it was revealed that the attorneys' law
firm would be advancing the costs of the litigation and that the plain-
tiffs would be required to reimburse counsel for all expenses should
plaintiffs lose. The relevant question became "[w]hether counsel can
67. 417 U.S. at 176.
68. Id at 177-78.
69. 507 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1974) (per curiam), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 914 (1975).
70. Id at 480.
71. 20 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1015 (D. Mass. 1975).
72. Id at 1016.
73. See, eg., Sanderson v. Winner, 507 F.2d 477, 479-80 (10th Cir. 1974) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 914 (1975); In re Toilet Seat Antitrust Litigation, 23 Fed. R. Serv. 2d
1005, 1009-10 (E.D. Mich. 1977); In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 22 Fed. R.
Serv. 2d 63, 64-65 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
74. 65 F.R.D. 379 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
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and will pay the expenses of suit, rather than whether plaintiffs can
afford them. ' 75 On this basis, at least two courts have suggested that
inquiry could shift to the attorneys' wherewithal to finance the notice.76
Plaintiffs' Ability to Pay Costs of Litigation
Another financial issue raised is whether the plaintiffs can pay the
general costs of litigation. It has been argued that this is an essential
inquiry into adequacy of representation in order to assure the vigorous
prosecution of the suit.77 If the plaintiffs cannot afford thorough dis-
covery and adequate expert witnesses, the unnamed class members will
not be adequately represented vis-a-vis the usually more affluent cor-
porate defendants.
78
One of the first cases on this financial issue was Ralston v. Volks-
wagenwerk, A. G. ,79 an antitrust class action in which the plaintiffs al-
leged a conspiracy by the defendants to fix prices on new Volkswagen
automobiles. The court limited the class to some 18,000 out of a possi-
ble 4,500,000 new car purchasers. Plaintiffs presented evidence that
they had $14,500 they were willing to commit to the lawsuit. The court
found, however, that this amount did not satisfy the adequacy of repre-
sentation requirement because the cost of notice, approximately $4,000,
was just "the tip of the iceberg."'80 Even though the plaintiffs could
afford to send the proper notice as mandated by Eisen IV, the plaintiffs
also would have to show that they could pursue the lawsuit to comple-
tion without additional financial contributions from any other mem-
bers of the class; otherwise inadequate financing might threaten the
"procedural and substantive interests" of the unnamed class mem-
bers.81 Although the court noted the action had been vigorously and
expertly prosecuted up to that time, it gave the plaintiffs' financial in-
adequacy as one of the reasons for denying class certification. 82
75. Id at 383.
76. See Guse v. J.C. Penney Co., 409 F. Supp. 28, 30 (E.D. Wisc. 1976), rev'don other
grounds, 562 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1977) (permitting discovery regarding finances of Milwaukee
Legal Services, attorneys advancing funds); MacLean v. Honeywell Information Sys., Inc.,
20 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1015, 1016 (D. Mass. 1975) (dictum) (if questions regarding attorney's
ability to finance notice became appropriate in future, attorney's affidavit would be
sufficient).
77. See note 56 & accompanying text supra.
78. Kaye & Sinex, The Financial Aspect of Adequate Refpresentation Under Rule
23(a)(4).'A Prerequisite to Class Certification?, 31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 651, 655 (1977). [here-
inafter cited as Kaye & Sinex].
79. 61 F.R.D. 427 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
80. Id at 433.
81. Id at 434.
82. Id See also National Auto Brokers Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 376 F. Supp.
620 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), in which the general financial condition of the plaintiff was cited as
one reason for denying the request to proceed as a class action. The court noted that plain-
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This issue arose in another antitrust suit that year, P.D.Q. Inc. v.
Nissan Motor Corp.,83 in which plaintiffs sought to proceed as a class
action in prosecution of their claims of conspiracy and price-fixing be-
tween the manufacturer and dealers of Datsun automobiles. The de-
fendants contended that none of the plaintiffs had the funds available
to prosecute effectively a lawsuit of that magnitude. Judge Atkins
agreed that "the financial means of the representative, bearing as it
does on the vigor of the prosecution, becomes an important area of
inquiry for the Court."84
Since the potential class was nationwide, the cost of sending the
notice was estimated to be $300,000. Depositions of the plaintiffs re-
vealed that neither of them had the funds to provide this notice. The
expense of discovery was also considered. Disregarding attorney's
fees, which were to be contingent, the court found that the pretrial ex-
penditures would exceed $10,000. The court did not deny certification,
as was done in Ralston, but rather limited the class to purchasers of
automobiles in two counties over a definite time period.
85
Despite these strong indications that plaintiffs' ability to finance
the entire suit is relevant to the question of adequate representation, the
Tenth Circuit in Sanderson v. WinnerM6 issued writs of mandamus and
prohibition which directed the district court to vacate extensive discov-
ery orders regarding the plaintiffs' financial worth. The court ruled
that Eisen IV did not call for unlimited inquiry into plaintiffs' financial
situation. It went on to state that the district court had wrongly ex-
panded and projected Eisen IV outside of the notice area which re-
sulted in limiting and curtailing Rule 23 "in a manner never
contemplated." 87 The court said that Eisen IV should not be inter-
preted to "approve oppressive discovery as a means of discouraging a
private antitrust action which, if meritorious, advances an important
interest of the government."
88
This language suggests that discovery of plaintiffs' financial worth
should not be allowed solely to determine if the plaintiffs are able to
finance the whole suit. However, the court's later reference to the two
tiff company had been in weak financial condition for over two years and recently had a
court judgment entered against it. Although plaintiff's attorney argued that plaintiff had
proven ability to conduct the litigation by having done so for over three years, the court
denied class certification.
83. 61 F.R.D. 372 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
84. Id at 377 n.5.
85. Id at 381.
86. 507 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1974) (per curiam), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 914 (1975); see
notes 69-70 & accompanying text supra.
87. Id at 479.
88. d at 480.
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earlier district court cases, P.D. Q. Inc. 89 and Ralston,90 may leave a
loophole for the defendant. Those cases were distinguished as poten-
tial nationwide classes with problems involving size and manageability,
two concerns the court felt were not present in Sanderson. The intima-
tion was that if problems of size and manageability were present, the
court might come to the opposite conclusion.9'
Thus, Sanderson provides only limited guidance as to when and to
whom a defendant may require plaintiffs to reveal their financial situa-
tion. Some commentators have argued that Sanderson was an incor-
rect application of Rule 23 and should be limited to its facts.92 They
maintain that even though a class is small, unnamed class members are
entitled to a properly financed prosecution. The relevance of plaintiffs'
finances would not change because of the size of the class; only the
level of scrutiny allowed would vary.93
Given Sanderson's ambiguity, it is not surprising that district
courts have split on the question since this decision. Although some
courts have declared plaintiffs' ability to finance the entire cost of the
suit relevant, 94 others have reached the opposite conclusion. 95 There is
no pattern suggesting that size or manageability problems are the sole
factors used in making the determination of relevance. 96  Of those
89. P.D.Q. Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 61 F.R.D. 372 (S.D. Fla. 1973); see notes 83-85
& accompanying text supra.
90. Ralston v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 61 F.R.D. 427 (W.D. Mo. 1973); see notes 79-82
& accompanying text supra.
91. For such an interpretation, see Rode v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 24 Fed. R. Serv.
2d 322, 325-26 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
92. Kaye & Sinex, supra note 78, at 662-63.
93. Id
94. See, e.g., In re Independent Gasoline Antitrust Litigation, 23 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 793
(D. Md. 1977); Simon v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 73 F.R.D. 480 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Rode v.
Emery Air Freight Corp., 24 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 322 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Chevalier v. Baird Say.
Ass'n, 72 F.R.D. 140 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Elster v. Alexander, 74 F.R.D. 503 (N.D. Ga. 1976);
Dennis v. Saks & Co., 20 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Waldman v. Electrospace
Corp., 68 F.R.D. 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
95. See, e.g., Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enterprises, Inc., 24 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 907 (E.D. Pa.
1977); In re Toilet Seat Antitrust Litigation, 23 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1005 (E.D. Mich. 1976);
Kleinman v. Sibley, 21 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 62 (E.D. Pa. 1975); MacLean v. Honeywell Informa-
tion Sys., Inc., 20 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1015 (D. Mass. 1975); In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust
Litigation, 22 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 63 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
96. The following large class actions have held the plaintiffs' ability to finance the cost
of the suit relevant: Rode v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 24 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 322 (W.D. Pa.
1977) (nationwide); Simon v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 73 F.R.D. 480 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (all
purchasers of Westinghouse common stock during period of Dec. 7, 1971 to Oct. 30, 1974);
Chevalier v. Baird Say. Ass'n, 72 F.R.D. 140 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (50,000 class members); Dennis
v. Saks & Co., 20 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (one-half million class members).
The following large class actions have held the plaintiffs' ability to finance the cost of the
suit irrelevant: Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enterprises, Inc., 24 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 907 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
(securities fraud); In re Toilet Seat Antitrust Litigation, 23 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 990 (E.D. Mich.
[Vol. 30
November 1978] DISCOVERY OF PLAINTIFFS' FINANCES
courts that have found the information relevant, discovery has been
allowed to differing degrees and in different manners. The cases fall
into the following categories: (1) plaintiffs must divulge the full fman-
cial data being sought;97 (2) plaintiffs must answer questions that show
their awareness of the extent of the costs and their willingness to as-
sume full responsibility for those CoStS;9 8 (3) plaintiffs must submit in
camera affidavits showing their willingness, as well as ability, to pay
the costs;99 or (4) plaintiffs must merely state unequivocally that they
will be ultimately responsible for all the expenses. 100
This mixed pattern in the district courts, ranging from no discov-
ery up to full financial disclosure, heightens the difficulty potential
plaintiffs face in forecasting their ability to retain financial privacy if
they were to initiate a class action. The prospect of sweeping discovery
could have a significant chilling effect on class actions, particularly be-
cause the rules are not consistently based on size of class or complexity
of the suit. A potential plaintiff may be willing to risk significant capi-
tal in order to halt illegal business practices but be unwilling to expose
detailed information about his private worth.
The courts' concern regarding plaintiffs' future ability to afford
the vigorous prosecution of the suit may be misplaced. As the suit
progresses, the court is in a position to monitor the activities of the
plaintiffs closely. Under Rule 23(d)(2) 10 the court may give the ab-
sentee members of the class an opportunity at any time to indicate
whether they consider the representation fair and adequate. Once the
court or class members determine that the suit is not being adequately
prosecuted, the class certification can be revoked to preclude the res
judicata effect on the unnamed class members, or new representatives
can be appointed.
Defendants can be protected also. If at any time the court deter-
mines that the action is being brought in bad faith, the court can dis-
miss the suit and award costs, including attorney's fees, to the
1976) (200,000 class members); Kleinman v. Sibley, 21 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 62 (E.D. Pa. 1975)
(securities fraud); MacLean v. Honeywell Information Sys., Inc., 20 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1015
(D. Mass. 1975) (worldwide); In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 22 Fed. R.
Serv. 2d 63 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (twenty-six state-wide classes. In re Nissan Motor Corp. Anti-
trust Litigation, 552 F.2d 1088, 1092 n.1 (5th Cir. 1977)).
97. See, eg., Rode v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 24 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 322 (W.D. Pa.
1977); Elster v. Alexander, 74 F.R.D. 503 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
98. See, efg., In re Independent Gasoline Antitrust Litigation, 23 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 793
(D. Md. 1977).
99. See, etg., Dennis v. Saks & Co., 20 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Waldman
v. Electrospace Corp., 68 F.R.D. 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See also National Super Spuds, Inc.
v. New York Mercantile Exch., 24 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1272, 1280 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
100. See, ag., Simon v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 73 F.R.D. 480 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
101. FED. R. CIrv. P. 23(d)(2).
defendant. 0 2 If the plaintiffs' representation has been in good faith, but
weak and ineffectual, defendant cannot recover costs when the suit is
dismissed. Defendant's resources, however, probably would not have
been taxed unduly in defending such an action. All in all, the equities
seem to rest with allowing the suit to progress until it is clear that the
representatives are not able to prosecute the suit vigorously or are
bringing the suit in bad faith rather than allowing discovery of plain-
tiffs' financial situation. If the court, nevertheless, finds this financial
information necessary, in camera affidavits provide less potential for
abuse than does revelation to the defendant.
Plaintiffs' Ability to Reimburse Funds Advanced by Attorney
The third attempt at discovery and challenge of plaintiffs' finan-
cial worth arises when the plaintiffs' attorney is advancing the costs of
litigation. The Code of Professional Responsibility expressly allows
advancement of funds only if the plaintiff remains ultimately liable for
the expenses.103 If the arrangement between plaintiff and attorney is
otherwise, the attorney can be found to be engaging in the unethical
conduct of "maintenance," which bears on whether the attorney is an
adequate representative. Arguably, when the court scrutinizes the attor-
ney's adequacy, 10 4 it should consider not only the attorney's possible
lack of experience and skill but also whether the attorney is engaging in
any unethical practices.105 The ethics of class counsel are of great im-
portance, particularly when it is remembered that the interests of so
many unnamed persons are at stake. Nevertheless, courts have held
that unethical conduct must be extremely offensive to warrant dismis-
sal or denial of certification of a class action in view of the policy favor-
ing the bringing of such suits. °6
Defendants can raise the spectre of maintenance in any suit in
which plaintiffs' individual recoveries, even if trebled under certain
102. See note 127 infra
103. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 5, DR 5-103(B) (1975).
104. See notes 54-55 & accompanying text supra. The court should use its broad power
as "'guardian of the rights of the absentees' to see that the absentees are represented by
counsel who is ethically as well as intellectually competent to represent them." Stavrides v.
Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 60 F.R.D. 634, 637 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
105. Class actions have been dismissed because of unethical conduct by the attorney.
See, e.g., Simon v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 16 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1021
(N.D. Tex. 1972); Korn v. Franchard Corp., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,845 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (certification of class action revoked because of solicitation by plaintiffs attorney),
rev'd, 456 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1972) (attorney subsequently replaced). See generally Haus-
mann, Legal Ethics and Litigation Tactics, 2 CLASS ACTnON REP. 3 (1973).
106. See, e.g., Halverson v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 458 F.2d 927, 932 (7th Cir.
1972); In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 22 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 63, 66 (S.D. Fla.
1975).
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statutory recoveries, 107 are small when compared to the vast amount of
money that would have to be paid to reimburse the attorney for costs if
the suit failed. In this situation defendants urge the court to adopt a
presumption of unethical maintenance thereby threatening the attor-
ney's adequacy of representation. Under this approach the financial
arrangement between plaintiffs and attorneys becomes relevant.
Indeed, some district courts have found questions regarding plain-
tiffs' agreements to reimburse to be relevant to the attorney's adequacy
of representation. In Stavrides v. Mellon National Bank & Trust Co. 108
the defendant was allowed to "inquire into the professional conduct of
the plaintiffs' counsel to attempt to discover disabling breaches of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which would prevent plaintiffs'
counsel from 'vigorously and forthrightly taking up the cause of the
class they seek to represent.' "109 The court compelled response to sev-
eral questions regarding the financial arrangements between plaintiff
and counsel that the plaintiff had refused to answer. 110
On the other hand, in Foremost Promotions, Inc. v. Pabst Brewing
Co.,"' an antitrust suit, the court found questions about financial ar-
rangements to be irrelevant. "The responses might lead to embarrass-
ing admissions of champerty or unconscionable arrangements as to fees
and expenses, but these excesses are not in any way relevant to the trial
of the particular issue." 2 This reasoning has been quoted and fol-
lowed in several class action decisions.' 13 In none of these cases did
the court associate ethical behavior with adequacy of representation.
This approach ignores the special concerns of the class action and the
protections given to the unnamed class members. Representation by
an attorney engaging in unethical conduct would be less than adequate
and is a proper matter for consideration by the court.
In Foremost, not only did the defendants argue that the possibility
of maintenance justified discovery of plaintiffs' financial arrangements
107. See note 29 supra.
108. 60 F.R.D. 634 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
109. Id at 637 (quoting Taub v. Glickman, 14 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 847, 849 (S.D.N.Y.
1970)).
110. "'Q. Have you agreed to pay your attorneys' legal fees for the work that they
perform for you?
"'Q. Dr. Stavrides, have you agreed to pay the legal costs involved in this suit if there
should be any?
"'Q. Dr. Stavrides, have you agreed to reimburse your attorneys any legal costs they
might incur in the prosecution of this action?
"'Q. Dr. Stavrides, have you been told that you may be required to pay the cost in-
volved in the prosecution of this action?"' Id at 638.
111. 15 F.R.D. 128 (N.D. M. 1953). See note 44 supra.
112. Id at 130.
113. See, ag., Amherst Leasing Corp. v. Emhart Corp., 65 F.R.D. 121, 126 (D. Conn.
1974); Giordani v. Hoffman, 278 F. Supp. 886, 891 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
and agreements to reimburse, but they also insisted that the attorneys'
advancement of funds caused the plaintiffs' individual financial worth
to become relevant. The theory was that if the plaintiffs did not have
adequate financial resources to bring the suit in the first place, plain-
tiffs' attorneys' expectation of reimbursement was unreasonable, thus
proving that the attorney was engaging in maintenance."14 Such a sit-
uation could indicate the suit was a frivolous action being initiated and
maintained by the plaintiffs' attorneys either to harrass the defendant
or to obtain a quick settlement, with no actual intent to risk capital by
pursuing the suit. The question faced by the courts became a dual one.
First, should defendants be able to discover plaintiffs' financial worth
to determine whether plaintiffs' attorneys entertained unrealistic expec-
tations of reimbursement? Second, should unrealistic expectation of
reimbursement constitute attorney maintenance justifying the dismissal
of the class action? The courts that have addressed these questions
have reached varying conclusions.
Judge Atkins in P.D.Q. Inc.1 5 wrestled with the problem of attor-
neys' unrealistic expectations of reimbursement. Plaintiffs' depositions
had revealed that they would not have the finances to send the proper
individual notice, estimated by the defendants to cost $300,000,116 to
the class of 2,500,000 members. Plaintiffs' attorneys announced that
they were willing to advance some of the necessary costs for notice and
litigation expenses. Since plaintiffs already had stated that they would
be unwilling to spend more than a few thousand dollars, the court
questioned whether the plaintiffs would be willing to reimburse the at-
torneys for an amount well in excess of this sum if the cause of action
failed.1 1 7 The court did not answer its own question. Instead, Judge
Atkins limited the class to a size for which the plaintiffs could pay the
cost of notice rather than having to obtain an advance of funds from
the attorneys.
Both the relevance of plaintiffs' individual financial worth and at-
torneys' unreasonable expectation of reimbursement were raised in
Sayre.118 The court ruled that plaintiffs' individual financial worth
was irrelevant since the attorneys were advancing the costs of the
suit. 19 The court rejected the argument that the potential for mainte-
nance made discovery relevant. It stated that "unrealistic or unreason-
able expectation of reimbursement standing alone, does not render
114. Sayre v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 65 F.R.D. 379, 384 (E.D. Pa.
1974); P.D.Q. Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 61 F.R.D. 372, 380 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
115. P.D.Q. Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 61 F.R.D. 372 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
116. The court estimated that pretrial expenses and cost of notice could range from
$25,000 to $250,000. Id at 378.
117. Id at 380.
118. Sayre v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 65 F.R.D. 379 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
119. Id at 381.
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plaintiffs' counsel (and therefore plaintiffs) inadequate representatives
of a class."' 20 The court said that class certification should not be de-
nied just because the sums advanced by the attorneys might greatly
exceed the resources of the plaintiffs. 121 Judge Newcomer then gave
policy reasons for the decision:
It is this Court's judgment-admittedly based on experience and
hunch rather than any collected empirical data-that to deny a class
whenever plaintiffs' counsel advances significant funds to plaintiffs
of little or modest means would be to defeat the very purposes which
class actions were designed to achieve .... As much as we are con-
cerned with possible unethical conduct by counsel, we cannot con-
done a policy which would effectively limit class action plaintiffs to
corporations, municipalities, or the rich.
122
The court did allow discovery of plaintiffs' understanding of their
liability for expenses. The court stated that if this information re-
vealed that the plaintiffs thought they were free from ultimate liability,
the assets of the plaintiffs might become relevant as evidence that the
attorneys were in fact maintaining the suit. Without some independ-
ent evidence of maintenance, however, there would be no discovery of
plaintiffs' financial worth.
The Tenth Circuit also appears to have adopted this approach. In
Sanderson,123 the court of appeals held that the agreements between
plaintiffs and their attorneys regarding the financing of the costs of the
litigation were irrelevant. The court took the position that neither the
court nor the defendant had a legitimate concern for plaintiffs' ability
to repay their lawyers or the propriety of the financial arrangements
under the Code of Professional Responsibility. "Legal ethics would
ordinarily be inquired into in separate proceedings but, in any event,
they do not call for an independent inquiry where, as here, no evidence
suggesting unethical conduct has surfaced."'124
Some courts have not been so reluctant to declare the information
relevant, but instead have attempted to limit discovery to protect the
120. Id
121. Id at 385; see correction of language at 69 F.R.D. 117 (1975).
122. 65 F.R.D. at 385.
123. Sanderson v. Winner, 507 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1974) (per curiam), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 914 (1975).
124. 507 F.2d at 478 n.2. This philosophy is reflected in a later district court case, In re
Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 22 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 63 (S.D. Fla. 1975), by Judge
Atkins, the same judge who had wrestled with these problems in P.D.Q. Inc. v. Nissan Mo-
tor Corp., 61 F.R.D. 372 (S.D. Fla. 1973); see notes 83-85 & accompanying text supra.
Judge Atkins declared the financial arrangements between plaintiff and attorney irrelevant
and thus not discoverable. He noted that the courts had been permissive regarding fman-
cial agreements between plaintiff and attorneys because vindication of "federal policy and
'the public interest through antitrust class actions has depended largely upon plaintiffs and
their counsel acting as 'private attorneys general."' 22 Fed. R. Serv. 2d at 65.
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plaintiff from harassment or unnecessary intrusions. For example, in
Dennis v. Saks & Co.,' 25 the court found that the ability of the repre-
sentative parties to pay for notice and other costs was relevant to
whether they would fairly and adequately represent all class members,
regardless of whether the attorneys were advancing the costs.
Because the cost of notice alone would far exceed the possible re-
covery of any individually named plaintiff, the question arose whether
there was a reasonable expectation of reimbursement to the attorneys
advancing the costs should the suit be unsuccessful. To ascertain
whether plaintiffs would remain ultimately liable, the court examined
in camera affidavits which showed that each representative party
would be able to advance all costs or would agree to reimburse the
attorney for any expenses advanced.126 Submission of these affidavits
satisfied the court that the plaintiffs would remain ultimately liable and
the adequacy requirement was considered fulfilled.
In sum, all these courts seem either to find the plaintiffs finances
irrelevant or, if relevance is found, to use controls to protect the plain-
tiff from unnecessary private disclosures. This approach seems sensi-
ble. If the court feels compelled to satisfy itself regarding the
plaintiffs' financial ability to bring the suit, it is more equitable and less
harassing for the court to examine this data rather than allowing the
defendant full discovery of information that might be strategically vital
to the plaintiff.
Plaintiffs' Ability to Pay Costs and Attorney's Fees of a Successful
Defendant
The final issue raised to make plaintiffs' financial worth relevant
and hence discoverable is whether plaintiffs must demonstrate finan-
cial resources sufficient to pay a successful defendant's costs and possi-
bly attorney's fees. 127 This issue differs significantly from the previous
125. 20 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
126. Id at 997-98; see Chevalier v. Baird Say. Ass'n, 72 F.R.D. 140, 147 (E.D. Pa. 1976);
Waldman v. Electrospace Corp., 68 F.R.D. 281, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
127. A common-law exception to the general rule against awarding attorney's fees to the
prevailing party arises when the losing party has "acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly,
or for oppressive reasons." Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,
258-59 (1975) (quoting F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974)).
In addition, some statutes authorize the award of attorney's fees to either prevailing plain-
tiffs or defendants at the discretion of the court. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. 11, 42
U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970); Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970);
Securities and Trust Indentures Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77000(e) (1976); Securities Exchanges Act,
§§ 9, 18, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(a) (1976). For other examples of these statutes, see Chris-
tiansburg Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C., 98 S. Ct. 694, 697 n.7 (1978).
For equitable reasons, attorneys' fees are awarded to prevailing defendants under a
different standard than that for plaintiffs. The Supreme Court has recently clarified the
criterion. "In sum, a district court may in its discretion award attorney's fees to a prevailing
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three arguments advanced. Allowing discovery on this rationale cre-
ates a new form of adequacy requirement, not to protect the unnamed
class members, but to protect the defendants. Because the purpose of
the Rule 23 adequacy of representation requirement is solely for the
protection of the unnamed class members, 128 plaintiffs' ability to pay
defendant's costs is not relevant to the determination of plaintiffs' ade-
quacy. This information is certainly not relevant to the subject matter
of the suit. There seems to be no basis, therefore, for declaring plain-
tiffs' fimances relevant on these grounds.
Accordingly, it is not surprising that courts have ruled this discov-
ery improper. For example, in Bogosian v. 6uf Oil Corp.,'2 9 the de-
fendant moved to compel plaintiffs answer to questions on plaintiffs
ability to satisfy a judgment for costs in the event the defendant pre-
vailed. The court held these questions improper because they were not
relevant to the subject matter of the suit.
130  Sanderson v. Winner131
also dealt with this issue. The Sanderson court stated the defendant
had no legitimate concern about plaintiffs' ability to pay a judgment
for costs. Ample opportunity for discovery of assets under Rule 69132
would be available once a judgment was entered for the defendant.
On the other hand, the potential for payment of defendant's attor-
ney's fees provided a successful argument for financial discovery in
Rode v. Emery Air Freight Corp. ,133 a Title VII1 34 sex discrimination
suit brought on behalf of a nationwide class. Even though the plain-
tiffs attorneys had agreed to advance the costs of the suit, the court
found the financial status of the plaintiff relevant and hence fully dis-
coverable. One of the major factors in the decision to compel financial
disclosure was section 706(k) of Title VII, which permits an award of
attorneys' fees to a prevailing defendant at the discretion of the
court. 135 The court noted that this provision, which seeks to penalize
defendant in a Title VII case upon a finding that the plaintiffs action was frivolous, unrea-
sonable or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith." Id at
700. This standard appears to apply to all statutes having the same basic wording as the
Title VII statute, such as Title II. Id at 697-98.
128. See notes 46-49, 54-59 & accompanying text supra.
129. 337 F. Supp. 1228 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
130. Id at 1230,
131. 507 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1974) (per curiam), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 914 (1975).
132. Id. at 480. Rule 69 provides procedures for enforcement of a money judgment. A
judgment creditor is allowed broad discovery under Rules 26 to 37 in order to locate assets.
12 WIGrr & MILLER, supra note 1, §§ 3011, 3014 (1973).
133. 24 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 322 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
134. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e through 2000e-17 (1970 &
Supp. V 1975).
135. This section provides: "In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court,
in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United
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frivolous suits, could be defeated if financial data of the plaintiff was
not discoverable. The plaintiffs attorney could use an indigent class
representative to assure that any award of attorney's fees and costs to
the defendant would be meaningless. In a broad class suit requiring
extensive discovery, the defendant could be "blackmailed" into settling
a frivolous claim if there were no hope of recovering from the plaintiff
the potential vast costs.
If other courts follow the analysis used -in Rode, bringing class
suits under other statutes that allow discretionary awarding of defend-
ant's attorney's fees will be severely hampered. 36 Although many
courts have expressed the fear of frivolous class action suits brought
solely for settlement value, federal courts possess sufficient controls 137
to protect defendants without insisting that a plaintiff reveal financial
worth before entering court. The protection of defendants does not
seem so critical as to justify such invasive discovery.
Conclusion
Under the banner of "adequacy of representation" and the Eisen
IT 1 3 8 requirement that plaintiffs send proper notice, defendants may
challenge the representatives' financial ability to bring the suit on be-
half of others. Defendants have thus gained a powerful weapon with
which to attack and delay class actions and harass class plaintiffs.
Without doubt, defendants have a legitimate concern with the plain-
tiffs' adequacy because of the need for assurance of the binding effect
of the action.139 A final decision in the defendants' favor could be set
aside by a subsequent collateral attack if the representation by the
States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person." Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970). See note 127 supra for the standard to be applied in the
exercise of discretion.
136. See note 127 supra. As the court's analysis in Rode was based on the possibility
that the plaintiff could bring the suit in "bad faith" and thus have to pay the defendant's
attorneys' fees, 24 Fed. R. Serv. 2d at 324 n.4, the danger exists that other courts might
follow this analysis in nonstatutory class actions. Under an exception to the American com-
mon-law rule, defendants may be awarded attorney's fees in any suit in which the plaintiff
has acted in bad faith. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59
(1975); Note, Attorney's Fees and the Federal Bad Faith Exception, 29 HASTInGs L.J. 319
(1977).
137. Courts have complete control to assure that procedures are fair, reasonable and
effective. For example, the court has the right under Federal Rule 23(c)(1) to alter, amend,
supplement, or vacate class certification. Federal Rule 23(e) requires court approval of any
dismissal or settlement.
138. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
139. If the defendant prevails on the merits or settles the dispute, the defendant clearly
benefits if all absentees are bound by the judgment. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472,
499 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1971).
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plaintiff is judged inadequate in the original suit.14° The defendant
would then face the necessity and expense of relitigating a controversy
which had been favorably decided. 41 Nevertheless, defendants' inter-
ests can be protected short of denial of the class or the full discovery of
the plaintiffs' fimances.
A district court judge stated that whether or not the personal fi-
nancial circumstances of representative plaintiffs are relevant, discov-
erable information depends upon the facts of each case. 142 Given that
courts have wide discretion in class actions, surely a matter so sensitive
as the possible revelation of plaintiffs' personal finances which are not
part of the litigated controversy should have more definite standards.
There should be guidelines setting forth exactly what personal informa-
tion will be required of plaintiffs.
To begin with, courts must properly be concerned with whether
representative plaintiffs are able to send proper notice to unnamed
class members.' 43 Allowing discovery to assure this capability is rea-
sonable given the res judicata effect of Rule 23 on the unnamed class
members.
It is not as critical to prejudge whether the plaintiffs will be able to
afford to prosecute the suit vigorously to its conclusion as it is to deter-
mine whether the named plaintiffs are able to give notice to the class.
The litigation should not be "sidetracked by a mini-trial in which de-
fendants attempt to prove that plaintiffs are financially incapable of
meeting the costs of [the] litigation." 144
Once the funds for the suit are advanced by the plaintiffs' attor-
neys, the plaintiffs' proper financial resources should no longer be rele-
vant since proper notice to class members is assured. The ethics of
"maintenance" in the context of class actions should be reexamined by
the legal profession. In large class actions it is unrealistic to assume
that a few individuals will be able to repay the costs of unsuccessful
litigation. This might even be objectionable since "the class attorney
may face a conflict of interest between his duty to the class as a whole
and his felt obligation to the financing class members."'145 Financially
supporting a class action is analogous to the risk taken by attorneys
140. See Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973).
141. See Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other
grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1971).
142. Elster v. Alexander, 74 F.R.D. 503, 504 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
143. Even though Eisen IVwas based on an interpretation of Rule 23,417 U.S. at 177, if
the legislature amended the rule allowing other than individual notice, the Supreme Court
would likely rule individual notice was required on constitutional due process grounds.
144. In re Independent Gasoline Antitrust Litigation, 23 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 793, 794 (D.
Md. 1977).
145. Symposium, Developments in the Law - Class Actions, 89 HAnv, L. Rnv.. 1318,
1620 (1976).
when conducting a lawsuit on a contingent fee basis. 146 If the suit
loses, the attorney should be able to bear the loss of not only fees but
also costs as a better "risk-spreader" than the plaintiffs. Such a ration-
ale may underlie the rarity of successful attorney maintenance
actions. 147
This is not to suggest that solicitation by the attorney should not
remain an unethical practice. Urging persons to join a lawsuit and be-
come clients strikes at the heart of legal ethics. Even if independent
information reveals the attorney has engaged in solicitation, the court
should replace the attorney instead of dismissing the class. Substan-
tive claims of plaintiffs should not be lost because the attorney has
overreached the boundaries of propriety.
Plaintiffs' financial situation should not be relevant only because
the class suit is brought under a statute that allows the discretionary
awarding of costs and attorney's fees to successful defendants. To allow
this discovery creates as much possibility of abuse by defendants as not
allowing this discovery provides to plaintiffs. As there is no problem
of adequacy of representation to unnamed plaintiffs inherent in the is-
sue, such discovery should not be allowed.
Through all of the difficulties and complexities of the class action,
the court must keep uppermost in mind the purpose underlying class-
action suits. One of the basic reasons for the creations of class actions
was to provide a forum for people of all income levels.' 48 Allowing
defendants to delve into the financial situation of plaintiffs, forcing
plaintiffs to prove their financial capability, unreasonably broadens the
requirements of Rule 23.149
146. See note 22 supra.
147. See Schnapper, The MAyth of Legal Ethics, 64 A.B.A.J. 202 (1978). "As was con-
firmed last year by the report on the grievance system by the Ad Hoc Committee on Griev-
ance Procedures of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, disciplinary
proceedings are almost exclusively limited to three abuses: attorneys who steal the funds of
their clients, attorneys who accept fees but fail to pursue their clients' cases, and lawyers who
commit felonies." Id at 203.
148. Rode v. Emery Air Frieght Corp., 24 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 322, 323 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
See note 58 supra.
149. In re Toilet Seat Antitrust Litigation, 23 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1005, 1010 (E.D. Mich.
1976).
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